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Government shares in total output are characterized by signiﬁcant variation across countries.
As a starting point of my study, I notice strong negative correlation between government con-
sumption share and price of government services in terms of private consumption. Motivated
by this empirical observation, I develop a neoclassical growth model with added government
that is capable of matching the variation in government shares very closely using only rel-
ative prices. In addition, I provide empirical evidence showing that the relative price of
government consumption increases in income which is consistent with distortions prevailing
in poor countries. These two observations combined imply that government shares tend to
be higher in poorer countries.
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11 Introduction
Government shares in total output are characterized by signiﬁcant variation across countries.
For example, in 1996 the diﬀerence between the top 5% and the bottom 5% of shares from
the Penn World Table (PWT) is almost 40 percentage points.1 This diﬀerence is striking,
given the mean value of 0.23. In this paper I oﬀer one possible scenario that can explain
cross-country variation in government size. First of all, I notice that there is strong neg-
ative correlation between relative government shares and relative prices of government to
private consumption using internationally comparable prices. Motivated by this empirical
observation, I develop a neoclassical growth model with added government that is capable of
matching the variation in government shares very closely using only relative prices. Finally,
I discuss the macroeconomic implications of this result.
As a starting point of my study I observe that government consumption shares decline
with the relative price of government consumption in terms of private consumption when
measured at international prices from PWT. It suggests that relative prices may play an im-
portant role in explaining the signiﬁcant variability in output composition across countries.
On the next stage, I develop a neoclassical growth model with added government implying
that government shares decline in the price of government consumption relative to private
consumption.2 Calibrating the model to the US economy and allowing only the relative price
to change across countries generates government shares that are very close to those from the
PWT data. This is the main result in the paper in the sense that the observed government
shares in PWT are very close to the ﬁrst-best socially optimal solution implied by the model.
It is somewhat remarkable how much of the variation in government shares can be explained
by a simple model which allows only relative government prices to vary across countries.
2Finally, I discuss possible macroeconomic implications of this result. In particular, I re-
port additional evidence showing that relative price of government consumption is higher in
richer countries. The relative price of government consumption in the model equilibrium is
equal to the inverse ratio of Total Factor Productivities in government and private sectors.3
These two observations imply that poorer countries are relatively more eﬃcient at producing
government than private goods. I argue that distortions that prevail in poorer countries in
the form of explicit and implicit taxation make private sector relatively ineﬃcient. When
this observation is combined with the result from my model, it implies that government
shares tend to be higher in poorer countries.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. To begin with, this
is the ﬁrst paper of which I am aware that identiﬁes strong dependence of government size
on relative productivity and also develops a model consistent with this dependence. Second,
the paper uses internationally comparable data from PWT that allows direct cross country
comparisons. Summers and Heston (1991) aggregation methodology for price comparisons
may be preferable to using nominal exchange rates that tend to deviate from purchasing
power parities (PPPs) in systematic ways. Moreover, the Penn World Table seems to have
observations on more countries over longer time spans with less missing data compared to
other data sets. Third, the explanation for government size variations put forward in this
paper is based on rigorous economic modeling. Previous empirical work aimed at explain-
ing diﬀerences in government size often does so in the absence of a well-developed theory on
how the available covariates determine government size. Finally, few papers have studied the
importance of relative prices in explaining variability in government shares across countries.4
This paper also has some limitations. First, the PWT deﬁnition of government is limited
only to government consumption (i.e. goods consumed collectively), so this is the notion
3I employ in this paper. Private consumption expenditure, on the other hand, includes all
private goods (i.e. goods that can in principle be sold to individuals and consumed by them
without any external beneﬁt to others).5 The detailed data on total government size over
such an extensive number of countries and years as in PWT do not seem to be available from
other sources. This may be a serious obstacle for extending the results to total government
size. The second limitation is that political considerations may play an important role in
determining the total government size in addition to TFPs. There is an extensive literature
on the subject - Meltzer and Richard (1981) is a prominent example - which ascertains the
role of welfare transfers.6 This paper shows that diﬀerences in TFPs can explain almost all
of the variation in government consumption around the world. However, in order to model
total government size, one might best consider a uniﬁed approach which also incorporates
political process and its role in determining welfare transfers.
Notwithstanding these limitations the current paper may be a signiﬁcant step forward in
our understanding of government consumption across countries and its relation to TFP dif-
ferences.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section I show that there is strong nega-
tive correlation between relative price of government consumption and relative government
shares. In Section 3 I develop a two-sector neoclassical growth model and derive a negative
relationship between relative government shares and relative prices as part of the model
equilibrium. I calibrate the model in Section 4. Results and robustness checks are dealt
with in Section 5. Section 6 discusses macroeconomic implications of the model and the last
Section concludes.
42 Relative prices and government shares
In this section I report the empirical relationship between relative prices and government
shares which motivates my theoretical model in section 3. To construct relative prices I use
series Price Level of Consumption (PC) and Price Level of Government (PG) from PWT 6.2
over the period 1970-2003. I deﬁne RPRICE as the relative price of government in terms of
consumption and normalize it by the corresponding ratio for the US.7 I also normalize Real
gross domestic product per capita (CGDP) for country j by the corresponding variables for
the US and apply log transformation to all series.
I report average correlations for 1970-2003, results for a benchmark year 1996 and the most
recent year in the data, 2003.8 The graphs are provided for the most recent year with bench-
mark data (1996) but time series graphs over the entire time period demonstrate similar
patterns and are available upon request. Table 1 and Figure 1 imply the following empirical
result:
Empirical Result. There is a negative correlation between the relative price of government
consumption and government share if measured at international prices.
[TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The correlation of relative government shares with RPRICE is -0.558. This empirical
observation is the focus of the current paper and a two-sector neoclassical growth model
in Section 3 is developed to account for this correlation.
3 Model
I use a neoclassical growth model with added government. There are two sectors that
produce private consumption and investment goods (C and I) denoted by Y and government
5consumption goods denoted by G. The production technology in country j in period t is



























where p is the constant cost of transforming one unit of consumption into investment which





t or as barriers to investment in the spirit of Restuccia and Urrutia (2001).




G grow in all countries j exogenously at a
constant rate (1 + gA).









































It, where r is
real rate of return on capital and P
j
It is price of investment goods in period t. Equal capital








































Each representative agent supplies unit of labor inelastically and chooses private and public






































Notice that private and government consumption goods enter separately in the utility func-











Y t + K
j
Gt.
It can be shown that along the balanced growth path (on which I will concentrate) C;I;G
and K all grow at the same rate (1 + g) = (1 + gA)
1
1¡®. The ﬁrst order conditions yield
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Gt and P us
Ct are the nominal prices in the USA. The ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximizing conditions



































































7which explains why I chose US nominal prices for the common set of prices. From the above
expression countries with higher relative productivity in private sector Y
j
t will tend to have
lower government shares if measured at common prices.
In the spirit of Restuccia and Urrutia (2001), for consistent cross-country comparisons I
need a measure of relative prices which is not subject to spurious correlations (e.g., due to
measurement error in international prices). To achieve this goal I approximate the ratio of








Ct) by the corresponding ratio of internationally



















This also provides the connection between the model and my empirical investigation above.11
Finally, setting total demand in the economy (obtained from the ﬁrst order conditions) to
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Equation (14) is the key equation at which my further analysis is centered. Before cali-
brating the economy and performing the quantitative experiments, it is useful to discuss the







is constant across countries j because it de-
pends only on the parameters of the model that are the same for all countries. The discipline
imposed by the model comes from the parameters that are calibrated to be consistent with
the notion of data in the Penn World Table. The only part of the model equation (14) that




Ct. The model implies







To evaluate the empirical success of the model, I need to calibrate parameters for technology
(®, g and ±) as well as for preferences (¯ and ´) that are consistent with data deﬁnitions in
PWT. I calibrate parameters to the United States because high quality data for calibration
are readily available for the entire period of 1970-2003 used in my study.
To calibrate technological parameters I broadly follow the procedure in Cooley and Prescott
(1995). First of all, after constructing the series of service ﬂows from private capital I ﬁnd
that the average interest rate for 1970-2003 is equal to 7:1%. The real average long-term
growth rate g is set to 1:9% using the series of the real per capita GNP. The law of motion
for the capital stock implies the average depreciation rate of government capital equal to
3:3%. I use this depreciation rate to construct the service ﬂows from the government capital.
Together with the service ﬂows from private capital and GNP this implies the average capi-
tal share of 0:30. The notion of capital in the calibration exercise should be consistent with
the notion of capital in PWT. Thus, it is not surprising that the value of ® is lower than
the value of 0:40 in Cooley and Prescott (1995), because PWT does not include consumer
durables and land in the series for investment. The overall depreciation rate for the economy
then equals 4.5% implying ¯ = 0:993.12 The resulting capital output ratio is 3.09.
Finally, I calibrate the parameter ´ so that equation (14) holds with equality for the US.
In other words, ´ is chosen to predict US government share exactly. The calibrated value
is reasonable: ´ = 0:84 is the weight attached to private consumption. The results of the
9calibration exercise are presented in Table 2 and further details are available from the author.
[TABLE 2 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 illustrates the results of the calibration exercise: the solid curve depicts government




Ct. The model equation,
calibrated as above, seems to capture a signiﬁcant portion of the variability in the data,
which is also conﬁrmed by my further quantitative analysis.
5 The quantitative experiment
In this section I perform the following quantitative experiment for the most recent year with
benchmark data (1996) in PWT: given the parameters calibrated to the US economy, I assess
how much of the variation in government shares the model can reproduce (from equation
14) if only relative government prices change.
The model generates the highest correlation of 0:484 for the countries above the median
income. The model slightly underpredicts the coeﬃcient of variation in the range from 0:865
(for the poorer subsample) to 0:944 (for the entire sample). Government shares from the
model generate a Gini coeﬃcient very close to that observed in the data (0:215 versus 0:228).
In general, the model explains a signiﬁcant portion of the cross-country variation in govern-
ment shares (Table 3). Figure 3 shows government shares from the model versus those from
the data for the entire sample.
[TABLE 3 AND FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
A few robustness checks may be useful. The reader might worry if the results are driven
by some tiny countries like St. Vincent and Grenadines with population of 112;509 and the
highest PWT government share of 57:13%. They are not. Table 4 reports the results for all
countries with population above 1 million.
10[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
In the calibration exercise I attempted to ensure that the conceptual framework of the model
economy is consistent with the PWT data. However, the reader may be interested to learn
how the results are aﬀected by marginal changes in the calibrated parameters. For this pur-
pose I increase and decrease each of the parameters r;g;± and ® by 10% and re-calculate ´
such that it still perfectly matches the US share. The results for the ﬁrst 4 parameters in
the entire sample are only marginally aﬀected and are available upon request.
On the other hand, changing ´ has a stronger eﬀect on model performance, as reported
in Table 5. Calibrating ´ to match US government share conveys a lot of information about
other countries and tends to explain a signiﬁcant portion of the variability in government
shares. The model is less successful in matching the two key statistics, the coeﬃcient of vari-
ation and the Gini coeﬃcient, if ´ is increased or decreased by only 10%. Thus, the model
suggests that the data are characterized by similarity in the preferences for government
consumption to the case of the US.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
6 Discussion
The model developed above is capable of explaining most of the variation in government
consumption around the world based solely on the relative price of government to private
consumption. What are the macroeconomic implications of this simple neoclassical setup?
Consider Figure 4 and Table 6 showing that the relative price of government consumption
increases with relative per capita income. This means that poor countries are relatively more
eﬃcient at producing government goods than rich ones.
[FIGURE 4 AND TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
11As a result, when evaluated at international prices, government shares are higher in poorer
countries and Figure 5 and Table 7 show some evidence in support of this claim.
[FIGURE 5 AND TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
The question that follows naturally is: why poorer countries are relatively better suited to
produce government goods than their richer counterparts? This empirical observation is con-
sistent with the existence of distortions against private sector that prevail in poor countries.
These distortions can take the form of oﬃcial taxes and regulations (such as trade quotas) or
implicit taxation. In the related literature, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) show that diﬀerences
in trade barriers and tax rates are relatively small to explain huge variation in income and
capital accumulation across countries. On the other hand, implicit restrictions in the form
of bureaucratic regulations, corruption, bribes, prohibitions and so on may be much more
important. Rectuccia and Urrutia (2001) provide some examples of those restrictions in
Latin American countries.
In any case, both types of taxation would bring about the diﬀerences in relative produc-
tivities in government and private sectors this paper relies on to explain cross-country vari-
ation in government consumption. Indeed, restrictions on private sector in poor countries
would make private good relatively more expensive shifting output in the direction of higher
government consumption. This would be consistent with the theoretical model and strong
empirical dependence of government size on relative prices presented in this paper.
7 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to explain signiﬁcant cross-country variation in relative gov-
ernment shares. I attempted to achieve this goal in the following three steps. First of all,
I noticed strong negative correlation between relative prices and government shares. Mo-
12tivated by this empirical observation, I developed a neoclassical growth model with added
government that was capable of matching government shares in the data very closely using
only relative prices. Finally, I argued that distortions against private sector that prevail
in poor countries make private consumption relatively more expensive. As a result, poorer
countries tend to have higher government consumption share.
It is important to bear in mind that the deﬁnition of government in PWT includes only
collective consumption and not total government expenditure, which encompasses transfers
and private goods purchased by the government. As such, the analysis I presented here
explains only variations in government consumption and not total government share in the
economy. Data availability over such a wide array of countries and over a signiﬁcant time
period may be a major obstacle in extending the results to total government size.
However, this last observation might be an interesting topic for future theoretical research:
it would be useful to develop a model that can explain total government size as the sum of
government consumption and government transfers. From this work and from the political
economy literature, it is clear that such a model should unify the two approaches, including
factor productivities as well as the political process.
While incorporating the political process into the model may be necessary to explain the
diﬀerences in the total government size, this work is a considerable step toward a better
understanding of government consumption around the world and its connection to economic
development. A simple economic story with prices driving the choice of optimal government
size may explain a signiﬁcant portion of cross-country diﬀerences in the size of government
consumption.
13Footnotes
1. This is the most recent year when the Penn World Table has benchmark price data for
a large number of countries. By the top (bottom) 5 % I mean the average share of 5% of
countries with the highest (lowest) government shares in PWT.
2. The model choice is motivated by the studies of investment rates in Restuccia and Urrutia
(2001) and Hsieh and Klenow (2007).
3. This is a familiar result in the literature with Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) being one
example.
4. Khan (1988) is one example.
5. For details please refer to Kravis, Heston and Summers (1982, 33-34).
6. The interested reader is referred to surveys such as Mueller (2001, chapter 21).
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by the US price ratio to avoid measure-
ment error in international prices.
8. Average 150 is based on a balanced sample of 150 countries that have data in every year
for 1970-2003. Average All takes all available observations for any year so that the number
of countries diﬀers over years. The two averages usually lie within a few percentage points
of each other.
9. Government goods are produced by competitive ﬁrms that participate in government
tenders and compete for contracts.
10. Note that I express the price of private good Y in terms of consumption.
11. In my empirical analysis above I use the ratio cgi=cgus instead of cgi. This will have the
eﬀect of centering the graphs with the US having share of 1 but, clearly, dividing all shares
by a constant US share will not aﬀect the correlations!
12. I do not include the population growth in my model economy because countries in the
sample are not necessarily characterized by the steady state population growth. The depre-
14ciation rate implicitly accounts for this fact because I use the growth rate g from the real per
capita GNP. The "eﬀective" time preference parameter would be clearly lower if accounted
for the population growth.
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16Tables
Table 1. Correlations between RPRICE and government shares (in logs)
All data (+/- 3 sd) Above (+/- 3 sd) Below (+/- 3 sd)
Average 150 -0.558 (-0.571) -0.590 (-0.596) -0.515 (-0.502)
Average ALL -0.534 (-0.554) -0.569 (-0.590) -0.493 (-0.492)
Year 1996 -0.527 (-0.504) -0.576 (-0.561) -0.445 (-0.373)
Year 2003 -0.562 (-0.608) -0.580 (-0.675) -0.547 (-0.546)
Note: All data are in current prices. First column - all data, second and third - above and below median
income subsamples, respectively. Correlations without outliers (not within 3 standard deviations) are in
parentheses. Average 150 is for a balanced sample of 150 countries that have all the data points for the
period 1970-2003. Average ALL stands for all available observations in each year so that the number of
countries diﬀers over years.







18Table 3. Government shares from the model and the data in 1996
All countries Mean St. Dev. CV Min 5% Max 5% Gini
Data 0.231 0.095 0.413 0.075 0.470 0.228
Model 0.200 0.078 0.390 0.085 0.390 0.215
Ratio 0.866 0.817 0.944 1.128 0.831 0.943
Correlation 0.425
Above median Mean St. Dev. CV Min 10% Max 10% Gini
Data 0.208 0.079 0.381 0.095 0.367 0.208
Model 0.165 0.057 0.346 0.087 0.288 0.184
Ratio 0.794 0.719 0.906 0.917 0.786 0.885
Correlation 0.484
Below median Mean St. Dev. CV Min 10% Max 10% Gini
Data 0.253 0.103 0.409 0.095 0.455 0.229
Model 0.232 0.082 0.353 0.120 0.396 0.197
Ratio 0.918 0.794 0.865 1.259 0.872 0.863
Correlation 0.361
Note: In all cases, outliers (not within 3 standard deviations) are excluded. CV stands for the coeﬃcient of
variation. Min (Max) 5% and 10% are averaged over the corresponding percentage of countries. US excluded
as a numeraire. Inclusion of US does not change results signiﬁcantly.
19Table 4. Government shares for countries with population above 1 million
All countries Mean St. Dev. CV Min 5% Max 5% Gini
Data 0.221 0.091 0.414 0.067 0.462 0.226
Model 0.206 0.082 0.400 0.090 0.412 0.219
Ratio 0.934 0.901 0.965 1.335 0.892 0.971
Correlation 0.464
Note: In all cases outliers (not within 3 standard deviations) are excluded. US excluded as a numeraire.
Inclusion of US does not change results signiﬁcantly.
20Table 5. The eﬀect of ´ on model performance
´=0.757 Mean St. Dev. CV Min 5% Max 5% Gini
Model 0.288 0.100 0.346 0.132 0.524 0.192
Ratio to Data 1.242 1.029 0.829 1.756 1.097 0.837
Correlation 0.460
´ = 0.925 Mean St. Dev. CV Min 5% Max 5% Gini
Model 0.101 0.046 0.452 0.039 0.220 0.244
Ratio to Data 0.438 0.479 1.093 0.521 0.468 1.070
Correlation 0.411
Note: US excluded as a numeraire. Inclusion of the US does not change results signiﬁcantly.
21Table 6. Correlations between RPRICE and real GDP per capita (in logs)
All data (+/- 3 sd) Above (+/- 3 sd) Below (+/- 3 sd)
Average 150 0.345 (0.375) 0.429 (0.432) 0.130 (0.139)
Average ALL 0.338 (0.375) 0.421 (0.452) 0.128 (0.144)
Year 1996 0.481 (0.481) 0.508 (0.508) 0.158 (0.175)
Year 2003 0.457 (0.475) 0.312 (0.463) 0.226 (0.226)
Note: All data are in current prices. First column - all data, second and third - above and below median
income subsamples, respectively. Correlations without outliers (not within 3 standard deviations) are in
parentheses. Average 150 is for a balanced sample of 150 countries that have all the data points for the
period 1970-2003. Average ALL stands for all available observations in each year so that the number of
countries diﬀers over years.
22Table 7. Correlations between government shares and real GDP per capita for 1970-2003
(in logs)
All data (+/- 3 sd) Above (+/- 3 sd) Below (+/- 3 sd)
Average 150 -0.209 (-0.227) -0.309 (-0.304) 0.037 (0.055)
Average ALL -0.193 (-0.209) -0.338 (-0.327) 0.053 (0.070)
Year 1996 -0.205 (-0.237) -0.380 (-0.354) 0.101 (0.096)
Year 2003 -0.204 (-0.288) -0.369 (-0.369) -0.052 (-0.150)
Note: All data are in current prices. First column - all data, second and third - above and below median
income subsamples, respectively. Correlations without outliers (not within 3 standard deviations) are in
parentheses. Average 150 is for a balanced sample of 150 countries that have all the data points for the
period 1970-2003. Average ALL stands for all available observations in each year so that the number of
countries diﬀers over years.
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y = − 0.41*x + 0.39
Figure 1: Log of Relative prices and government shares in 1996 (Correlation: -0.504).
Note: Equation and line are based on linear regression.


















































































































































































































Figure 2: Model equation vs the data.
Note: Each point depicted as a three letter code stands for the corresponding government share in the data.
Curve shows government shares predicted by the model given the calibrated values.











































































































































































































y = 0.53*x + 0.13
Figure 3: Government shares from the model and the data in 1996.
Note: Equation and line are based on linear regression.





























































































































































































y = 0.21*x − 0.2
Figure 4: Log of Relative prices and relative income in 1996 (Correlation: 0.481).
Note: Equation and line are based on linear regression.











































































































































































































































y = − 0.086*x + 0.48
Figure 5: Relative government shares and relative income in 1996 (Correlation: -0.237).
Note: Equation and line are based on linear regression.
28